

# Keeping or Building Peace? UN Peace Operations beyond the Security Dilemma

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**Abstract:** *One of the most consistent findings on UN peace operations (UNPOs) is that they contribute to peace. Existing scholarship argues this is because UNPOs' peacekeeping troops solve the security dilemma that inhibits combatant disarmament and prevents their political leaders from sharing power. We argue that existing scholarship's focus on peacekeeping troops overlooks UNPOs' role in enabling governments to implement redistributive power-sharing reforms contained in peace agreements, along with their broader peace processes. While peacekeeping troops can help belligerents refrain from violence, military force alone cannot explain how political elites implement redistributive reforms that threaten their status. We argue that UNPOs that have predominant peacebuilding (as opposed to peacekeeping) mandates help sustain political elites' commitment to implementing peace agreement reforms and, thus, contribute to inclusive peace (increased political inclusion and reduced violence). We test our argument using a data set on UNPO mandates and original fieldwork on three sequential UNPOs in Burundi.*

**Verification Materials:** The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KRN6TB>.

Since 2000, United Nations (UN) member states have significantly increased the capacity of UN peace operations (UNPOs) to stop violence and build peace in war-torn countries by giving UNPOs greater peacekeeping *and* peacebuilding capacity. Existing scholarship has analyzed UNPOs' growing peacekeeping capacity while largely overlooking their new peacebuilding focus (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). This “peacebuilding turn” is manifest in the 2005 establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the increased emphasis of UNPO mandates on peacebuilding, all intended to build inclusive political institutions that prevent post-conflict countries from falling back into war. We investigate *whether* and *how* UNPOs' increased peacebuilding capacity fosters “inclusive peace,” a combined outcome of violence reduction and political inclusion.<sup>1</sup>

UN peacebuilding aims to enable post-conflict peace by facilitating elite political dialogue and supporting reform of the security and judicial sectors, consolidation of democratic political institutions and media, and provision of socioeconomic support to war-affected populations (PBSO 2010). Rather than simply reinforcing an agreement among elites, these redistributive reforms aim to enable politically marginalized groups to benefit from the state and the influx of post-conflict resources. The UN Security Council (UNSC) has allocated related peacebuilding capacities across both types of UNPOs—peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and special political missions (SPMs)—to support ongoing peace processes in war-torn countries, in support of which these UNPOs are deployed (DPKO 2008). These peace processes may, in fact, encompass several UNPOs, peace agreements, and their implementation (UN High-Level Panel 2015, 48).

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<sup>1</sup>Political inclusion “refers to the extent and manner in which the views and needs of parties conflict and other stakeholders are represented, heard, and integrated into a peace process” (UNSG 2012, 11).

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We argue that the focus of peace agreements, and their broader peace processes, on redistributing resources to marginalized groups carries high political and financial costs, leading to an inherent *implementation problem* (Molloy and Bell 2019). First, the governing elites charged with implementing peace agreements may pay high political costs for implementing redistributive reforms (Ciorciari 2021; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). In conflict-affected states, sustaining a position in government may be one of the few pathways to power and wealth, both for individual leaders and for the “clients” who depend on them (Arriola 2009; Bratton and Walle 1994). Second, implementing peace agreement reforms carries a high financial cost, requiring the influx of financial resources to enable the government to deliver more equitable services to the entire population (UN and WB 2018; Walter 2015).

The peacekeeping literature has generally conflated two interlinked commitment problems, one stemming from the security dilemma—when warring parties fear disarmament will allow the other party to win (Jervis 1978; Walter 2002)—and the other stemming from the abovementioned political and financial costs of peace agreement implementation. Early peacekeeping literature *infers* that the peacekeeping troops permit the implementation of peace agreements by addressing the security dilemma (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2008; Walter 2002), but it does not observe *how* UNPOs might cement the peace agreement’s fragile political bargain once security is established (i.e., the security dilemma is solved) (Stedman 2002). We build on an emerging stream of UN peacekeeping literature that questions the security dilemma’s ability to explain the political effect of UNPOs, yet has not considered the influence of the peacebuilding turn (Dayal 2021; Howard 2019; Matanock and Lichtenheld 2022).

We advance a theory that UNPOs with *peacebuilding capacity* address the implementation problem by (a) *mobilizing political support* among former warring parties for the implementation of reforms outlined in a peace agreement and (b) *filling state capacity gaps* necessary to implement these reforms. Neither of these two goals is directly addressed by solving the security dilemma, nor by peacekeeping troops alone. Whereas peacekeeping troops can use force to compel armed actors to comply with the security provisions of peace agreements (Howard 2019), peacebuilding uses political dialogue and projects to sustain the commitment of political actors to implement redistributive reforms (DPKO 2008).

To test the effect of UNPOs’ peacebuilding focus on inclusive peace and to uncover the related causal process, we adopt a multimethod research design using original

quantitative and qualitative data (Goertz 2017; Seawright 2016). We use a new data set on UNPO mandates and the coarsened exact matching (CEM) method (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) to analyze the effect of the proportion of peacebuilding tasks in UNPOs on levels of political inclusion and violence from 1997 to 2017 (Di Salvatore et al. 2022).<sup>2</sup> We analyze PKOs as well as SPMs. As SPMs have become more common than PKOs (Clayton, Dorussen, and Böhmelt 2020) and yet are not often addressed in scholarship, their inclusion is an important innovation of this article.


To examine the influence of our posited mechanism—how a UNPO uses its peacebuilding capacity to mobilize political support and provide the supplementary capacity necessary for the host government to implement redistributive reforms—we analyze three consecutive UNPOs in Burundi using original ethnographic and archival data. The three UNPOs in Burundi (one of the earliest focus countries of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture) represent typical cases of the different manifestations of the UN peacebuilding turn while also permitting us to engage in most-different case analysis to examine the relevance of our posited causal mechanism when considering alternative explanations (Gerring 2017).

Our findings have broad significance for the peacekeeping literature. First, this is the first assessment of the effect of a crucial but overlooked policy shift in the UN, namely, the peacebuilding turn that started in the early 2000s. Second, our analysis identifies an *additional* effect of UNPOs—inclusive peace—that is distinct from, but a likely precursor to, the literature’s standard democratization and violence measures (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2023; Fortna and Huang 2012). Third, our multimethod design identifies the mechanism by which UNPOs’ peacebuilding capacity facilitates political inclusion, uncovering a causal process that has been unobservable in prior quantitative studies. Finally, our findings have important policy implications, demonstrating the potential value of peacebuilding financing, even in the face of growing resource constraints (UNSG 2020).

## The Peacebuilding Turn in UNPOs

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali first articulated the logic of the UN’s peacebuilding turn in his 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, which

<sup>2</sup>We measure the peacebuilding focus of UNPOs as the prominence of peacebuilding tasks *relative to* security tasks, rather than missions’ multidimensionality (i.e., whether they have both peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks).

**FIGURE 1 Peacebuilding in UN Peace Operations**

Notes: The blue line (top graph) shows the percentage of sentences in UNSG reports on peace operations containing the word *peacebuilding* in a given year, using data from Amicarelli and Di Salvatore (2020). The purple line (bottom graph) shows the number of peacebuilding tasks in missions' mandates in a given year.

stated that whereas “peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained,” peacebuilding is required to “address the root causes of the conflict” and “create structures for the institutionalization of peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, para. 49). But the 2000 Panel on Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”), which assessed the effectiveness of the flurry of UNPOs mandated in the 1990s, found that UNPOs still lacked crucial peacebuilding capacities (UN High-Level Panel 2000). The Brahimi Report’s subsequent call for increased peacebuilding capacity in and around UNPOs launched the peacebuilding turn. It called for “the United Nations system [to] address what has hitherto been a fundamental deficiency in the way it has conceived of, funded, and implemented peace-building strategies and activities” (UN High-Level Panel 2000, ix).


After 2000, the UN gradually increased UNPOs’ focus on peacebuilding, as articulated by one Security Council member:

Military operations alone cannot provide sustainable peace. A whole range of humanitarian and peacebuilding elements has been included

in the more recent mandates. The list of such activities seems to grow with each new mandate. (UNSC 2004b, 26)

In line with this, the bottom graph in Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of peacebuilding tasks in UNPOs’ mandates since the 1990s, pointing to a steady increase in peacebuilding tasks since 2000 (based on the Peacekeeping Mandate data set; Di Salvatore et al. 2022). Beyond mandates, the increased focus on peacebuilding is also evident in the regular Secretary-General’s (UNSG) reports on UNPOs. The top graph in Figure 1 captures the increased use of the term *peacebuilding* in UNSG reports to the Security Council on the progress UNPOs make toward the fulfillment of their mandates. Although peacebuilding is largely absent from UNSG reports on UNPOs prior to 2000, it increases significantly after 2004, just prior to the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.

The UN General Assembly established the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005 to address the fact that “no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the

**FIGURE 2 Peacebuilding Fund Projects and UN Missions, 2007–2019**

Notes: Countries hosting a PBF project between 2007 and 2019 are in gray; countries hosting a UNPO are in blue; blue-and-gray-striped pattern is for countries hosting both a PBF project and a UNPO.


transition from war to lasting peace” (UNSG 2005b, 31).<sup>3</sup> Even though the number of peacebuilding tasks in UNPO mandates increased, only a subset of these tasks is covered by assessed contributions (i.e., annual member-state dues used to finance UNPOs; UNSG 2020, 8–10). The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) stepped in to directly or indirectly help fill this gap, supporting UNPOs in implementing numerous peacebuilding components of their mandates (UNSG 2021).

As depicted in Figure 2, the majority of PBF funds are allocated to countries where there are also UNPOs,

illustrating that although peacebuilding can take place without UNPOs—some countries with PBF projects do not host UNPOs—the presence of UNPOs without UN peacebuilding is relatively rare. Furthermore, the PBF’s strong support for dialogue and democracy (Figure 3) has been particularly important in financing the political efforts of UNPOs, and their Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), to help “support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement” (DPKO 2008, 22). The need for UNPOs to use

priorities; the Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental body intended to mobilize funding and political support; and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO; UNGA 2005).

<sup>3</sup>The Peacebuilding Architecture includes the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a funding instrument to support urgent peacebuilding

**FIGURE 3 PBF Projects by Theme, 2007–2021**

Notes: Bar shows the amount allocated to each Peacebuilding Fund thematic area (top graph). Themes are grouped in macro areas in the bottom graph. Purple bars indicate key peacebuilding themes.

diplomacy and dialogue to mobilize political buy-in for the peace agreement is crucial because even though host governments consent to UNPOs, the “absence of trust between the parties in a post-conflict environment can, at times, make consent uncertain and unreliable” (DPKO 2003, 32).

In sum, the peacebuilding turn has led UNPOs to have greater peacebuilding capacity than in the past, including (a) mandates that have a higher proportion of peacebuilding tasks and (b) increased financial resources to implement these peacebuilding tasks. While UN-

POs still vary in their degree of peacebuilding capacity, we contend that their increased peacebuilding focus enables them to address the implementation problem and support broader political inclusion. Pinpointing the mechanism that may facilitate this broader political inclusion requires examining how all UNPOs (not just PKOs) with a peacebuilding focus (not just with coercive military power) may help the host government implement reforms that increase political inclusion *and* reduce levels of violence.

## How Peacebuilding Capacity Helps Manage the Implementation Problem

The initial pathbreaking scholarship on peacekeeping found that peacekeepers address the security dilemma by providing the security necessary for warring parties to commit to the provisions outlined in a peace agreement (Fortna 2008; Walter 1997, 2002). Peacekeeping does this by solving the information problem identified in the security dilemma—each party is unlikely to disarm because of a lack of certainty that the other party is also disarming (Jervis 1978; Walter 2002; Walter and Snyder 1999). This scholarship argues that by providing the security necessary for the different groups of combatants to disarm simultaneously, and by verifying this disarmament, peacekeeping enables a cease-fire to hold and permits the political actors to fully disarm and implement the other aspects of the peace agreement (Walter and Snyder 1999). Some of the early peacekeeping scholarship also pointed to the peacebuilding role of UNPOs, finding that robust peacekeeping forces address the security dilemma and improve levels of democracy over time when local capacity exists (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). However, these studies measured the effect of the number of peacekeepers deployed rather than UNPOs' peacebuilding capacity.<sup>4</sup>

Much of the subsequent scholarship echoes the prior's emphasis on how peacekeeping troops address the security dilemma by solving commitment problems. Through increasingly fine-grained subnational analysis, these scholars find that the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops to conflict-prone locations reduces the duration of conflict episodes (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017) and levels of violence against civilians (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2019), and it even makes local-level intergroup cooperation more likely (Nomikos 2022). An emerging group of scholarship also demonstrates how nonmilitary tools, such as strategic communications (Howard 2019) and conditional aid incentives (Dayal 2021; Fortna 2008; Matanock and Lichtenheld 2022), can also incentivize combatants to stop engaging in armed conflict, enabling their political representatives to

commit to the peace agreement. This line of argument assumes that once the threat of violence is removed, via the deployment of peacekeepers, former warring parties willingly engage in the political process of implementing the peace agreement (Walter 1999, 129). But, as Fortna (2008, 85) argues, the implementation of the power-sharing agreement is far from certain: "All sides have a strong incentive to make a power grab that shuts the other out politically."

By focusing on the role that peacekeeping operations play in compelling armed combatants to end hostilities, existing scholarship overlooks what we refer to as the *implementation problem*: power-sharing governments' difficulty implementing redistributive political, security, and economic reforms in a context of high political mistrust and resource scarcity. The implementation problem also applies to reforms that may not be explicitly articulated in a peace agreement, and may in fact begin prior to or several years after the agreement, but which are part of the broader peace process aimed to create inclusive political, social, and economic institutions to sustain peace (UN Advisory Group of Experts 2015). The implementation problem has political and resource dimensions; we discuss these two aspects of the implementation problem below and how UNPOs' peacebuilding capacity can address both.

First, governments that are charged with implementing these reforms are composed of former enemies who often rely on their position in government for their own and their "client's" prosperity. By agreeing to serve in a government that is implementing an inclusive peace agreement, former enemies agree to develop and implement policies that redistribute their resources and those of the state they govern (Barma 2016; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2013). This inevitably means that some politicians charged with the implementation will lose power and resources because of it (Lee 2021). Furthermore, much of the political contestation that plagued the peace agreement negotiations is likely to reappear during its implementation—although this time without the support of an external mediator (Wolpe 2011).

In the words of one senior UN official: "Implementation...not only cannot, but should not, be expected to be a mirror image of the original agreement. Much of its value resides indeed in the new opportunities and constraints that emerge during implementation to give the peace settlement its final shape" (Arnault 2006, 1). These factors create potentially high political risks, and potentially high rewards as well, for the elites charged with designing and implementing the peace agreement's inclusive reforms. Military tools can support the implementation phase by reducing security concerns

<sup>4</sup>Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 88) analyze 27 PKOs from 1944 to 1997, five of which are multidimensional (i.e., with both military and civilian capacities), while Fortna (2008) examines the effect of PKOs on 94 cease-fires from 1989 to 1999. This article is different in that it accounts for the increase in peacebuilding capacity after 2000, previously unobserved temporal variation in this capacity, this capacity in SPMs as well as PKOs, and the effect of this capacity on a shorter-term inclusive peace measure.

for parties (Maekawa, Ari, and Gizelis 2019), but they are not sufficient to sustain continued negotiation and dialogue.

Second, states that have been weakened by years of civil war often lack the financial and policy resources necessary to implement redistributive policies called for in the peace agreement (Fjelde and De Soysa 2009; Maekawa, Ari, and Gizelis 2019; Sobek 2010). The precise content of peace agreement reforms is rarely fully specified in the peace agreement or is unrealistic (Colchester, Izquierdo, and Lustenberger 2020). Thus, their implementation requires that government elites, who may never have designed similar policies before, develop the requisite policies via further negotiation (Arnault 2006). However, elites often have little time or resources to prepare to assume “the new responsibilities included in the peace agreement” (Colchester, Izquierdo, and Lustenberger 2020, 7). The implementation of inclusive peace agreement reforms also requires the influx of financial resources necessary for the state to rebuild its capacity and serve formerly marginalized groups. Even if full implementation of these reforms would take decades, an influx of financial resources is still required to jump-start the reforms (Barma 2016; Suhrke 2007). Many aid donors consider conflict-affected countries to be high-risk investments and are reluctant to immediately allocate large amounts of development aid directly to the government (Campbell and Spilker 2022), leaving a crucial gap in peacebuilding funding that the UN’s peacebuilding turn sought to solve (UN High-Level Panel 2004).

Consequently, we contend that even if UNPOs manage to solve the security dilemma and halt violence, the implementation of inclusive reforms still requires a sustained political process that is subject to the contestation and resource constraints apparent in most other distributive political processes. We argue that when UNPOs have *peacebuilding capacity*, they are able to provide political resources, such as staff specialized in dialogue and negotiation, to sustain political actors’ consent to the peace process and the financial and technical resources to help political elites implement the redistributive reforms outlined in the peace agreement. As mentioned, peacebuilding capacity is visible in UNPOs’ mandates and their focus on peacebuilding tasks, as compared to traditional peacekeeping tasks.

Table 1 shows how UNPOs’ peacekeeping tasks primarily entail military capacity—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); control of small arms and light weapons; demilitarization; arms embargoes; protecting civilians; offensive operations; and cease-fires monitoring.

Although these peacekeeping tasks help to deter combatant violence, they do not directly tackle the political and financial challenges inherent in the implementation problem. They do not aim to maintain the consent and buy-in of political elites for the peace process or develop and implement redistributive reforms that allocate resources to formerly marginalized groups. Conversely, as depicted in Table 2, UNPO peacebuilding tasks aim to do just that: support the development of integrated and accountable security forces, reform the judicial system and supporting conflict resolution mechanisms; support democratic elections and an independent civil society and media; and provide urgent assistance to groups most affected by the conflict. Together, on aggregate, these efforts enable political elites and their constituents to implement the peace agreement, however incrementally and unevenly (Joshi and Quinn 2017). Although numerous studies have identified the difficulties facing individual reforms (Campbell 2018; Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii 2013), when compared to a context in which the UNPO has little capacity to support these reforms, we contend that greater aggregate peacebuilding capacity is likely to support greater advancement toward inclusive peace.

In sum, the increased peacebuilding capacity (relative to peacekeeping capacity) of peacebuilding-focused UNPOs allows them to solve the implementation problem by (a) continuously *mobilizing political consent and buy-in* for redistributive reforms among political elites and their constituents and (b) providing the financial and policy resources necessary to begin addressing *governments’ capacity gaps* to implementing these reforms. Our account of a UNPOs’ peacebuilding effect is not an alternative to their conflict reduction effect; it happens in addition to the latter but is centered on the political rather than military activities UNPOs carry out to support advancements in inclusive peace. Consequently, we expect that, all else equal, the greater the focus of UNPOs on peacebuilding (as reflected in the mandated tasks), the higher the likelihood of inclusive peace in the country. One observable implication of the degree to which a UNPO prioritizes peacebuilding is the proportion of peacebuilding tasks in its mandate. According to this argument, we derive the following hypothesis:

- H1: UNPOs with a higher proportion of mandated peacebuilding tasks are more likely to produce inclusive peace (greater levels of political inclusion and no recurrence of war-related violence).*

**TABLE 1 Description of Peacekeeping Tasks Based on PEMA's Codebook**

Peacekeeping Task	Example from Mandates
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	"To coordinate with the Government [...] and participate in regional coordination and information mechanisms to improve protection of civilians and support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration" (S/RES/2057)
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons	"To observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms, and related material across the border" (S/RES/2057)
Demilitarization	"To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city" (S/RES/872)
Arms Embargo	"To support [...] the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992)" (S/RES/814)
Civilian Protection	"[To] ensure [...] effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, including through active patrolling" (S/RES/2147)
Sexual and Gender-based Violence	"To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict [...] and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict" (S/RES/2164)
Offensive Operations	"To continue to anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, to ensure prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and to prevent a return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats" (S/RES/2423)
Cease-Fire	"To observe and monitor the implementation of the joint declaration of the end of the war [...], to prevent, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, any hostile action, in particular within the Zone of Confidence, and to investigate violations of the ceasefire" (S/RES/1609)
Peace Agreements	"To continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement" (S/RES/918)

## Empirical Approach

We investigate the impact of UNPOs' increased peacebuilding capacity on political inclusion with a multi-method research design (Goertz 2017). First, we present a cross-national statistical analysis of all recent (1996–2017) UNPOs based on a matching strategy. While the statistical analysis isolates the relationship between UNPO peacebuilding capacity (relative to peacekeeping capacity) and inclusive peace, it cannot explain *how* UNPO peacebuilding capacity helps to foster inclusive peace (Seawright 2016). Our three sequential UNPO cases, within the Burundi country context, help to gather microlevel data on our posited causal mechanism: how UNPO peacebuilding capacity mobilizes political support and provides the supplementary capacity necessary for the host government to implement redis-

tributive reforms specified in the peace agreement or process.

Burundi was one of the first two countries selected as a focus country by the UN Peacebuilding Commission and, even prior to this, received a high degree of peacebuilding support to prevent its descent into genocidal violence, like its neighbor Rwanda (Rubin 1998). Between 1993 and 2010, the UN deployed three different UNPOs to Burundi, all of which had peacebuilding capacity: one small political mission without peacekeepers, one relatively large peacekeeping mission with significant peacebuilding capacity, and one large political mission with significant peacebuilding capacity and no peacekeepers. The UNPO peacebuilding efforts in Burundi represent typical cases of the UNPOs' peacebuilding capacity (Gerring 2017, 56–58). Their variation, and the variation in the surrounding context, also enables us to engage in a



**TABLE 2 Description of Peacebuilding Tasks Based on PEMA's Codebook**

Peacebuilding Task	Example from Mandates
Police Reform	"To assist in the re-establishment of [national] police, as appropriate at the local, regional, or national level" (S/RES/814)
Military Reform	"Supporting [...] in developing a military justice system that is complementary to the civil justice system" (S/RES/1996)
Border Control	"Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges: [...] To monitor and deter the activities of militias" (S/RES/2162)
Reconciliation	"To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning" (S/RES/1270)
Transitional Justice	"To assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law" (S/RES/814)
Justice Sector Reform Prison Reform	"To help reinforce the independence of the judiciary, build the capacities, and enhance the effectiveness of the national judicial system as well as the effectiveness and the accountability of the penitentiary system" (S/RES/2387)
Legal Reform	"To assist [...] in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system" (S/RES/1778)
Democratization	"Provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the national, provincial, regional and local levels" (S/RES/1756)
Electoral Assistance	"The conduct of a limited but reliable international observation of the first and second rounds of the legislative elections" (S/RES/1201)
Voters' Education	"[D]esigning and implementing a civic education and public information strategy" (S/RES/1389)
Political Parties Assistance	"To provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties" (S/RES/1159)
Civil Society Assistance	"Support for the mediation of inter-communal conflict, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with the Government of Sudan, the United Nations Country Team and civil society" (S/RES/2363)
Media Assistance	"[P]romoting the establishment of an independent media" (S/RES/1996)
Management of Resources	"[C]urtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources" (S/RES/1856)
Extension of State Authority	"To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country" (S/RES/2100)
Demining	"To assist the parties to the [peace agreement] in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination" (S/RES/1590)
Economic Development	"[T]o facilitate the work of the UN Country Team and expert agencies on early recovery and reconstruction" (S/RES/1935)
Humanitarian Relief	"Support the provision of humanitarian aid" (S/RES/997)
Public Health	"To coordinate with UNMEER [Ebola Emergency Response], as appropriate" (S/RES/2215)
Refugee Assistance	"Support government effort [...] to create an environment conducive to voluntary, safe and dignified return" (S/RES/1925)

most-different case analysis to examine repeatedly the effect of our posited mechanism as well as the influence of several alternative explanations (Gerring 2017, 83–88).<sup>5</sup>

Each of the three UNPOs deployed to Burundi between 1993 and 2010 allows us to investigate the presence of our posited causal mechanism, which is unobservable in our cross-national analysis, and to address the potential influence of three alternative explanations: the signature of an inclusive peace agreement, the presence of peacekeepers, and the consent of the host government (which is also unobservable in our statistical analysis; Gerring 2017). Our case study analysis uses UN archival documents, employs secondary source material on the Burundian context and the behavior of the UN, and draws on over 240 semi-structured interviews with a range of UN, Burundian government, civil society, and donor officials (see Appendix F, p. 13).

For our cross-national statistical analysis, we use a sample of 31 countries from 1996 to 2017 that hosted a UN mission authorized after 1996. Our unit of analysis is country-mission-year, and each country enters the sample on the first year the UN deploys a mission.<sup>6</sup> In total, the final sample comprises 352 country-year observations. This sample of 31 countries includes 64 UNPOs, 35 of which are peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and 29 of which are political missions (SPMs). We exclude interventions that are neither PKOs nor SMPs. On average, countries in our sample hosted more than two missions (1.3), with some hosting up to five missions at different time periods (e.g., Haiti and Angola).

Our argument hinges on the assertion that peace agreements and the redistributive reforms contained therein are difficult for governments to implement. These reforms aim, in the long term, to foster more liberal democratic institutions grounded in rule of law and a market-based economy (Barnett 2006). Despite UNPOs' long-term ambitions, we focus on a more realistic short-term outcome: *inclusive peace*. Our dependent variable—*inclusive peace*—is a compound measure that includes increased levels of political inclusion and reduced levels of violence. These two conditions are individually measured and then combined to operationalize a concept of peacebuilding that neither of them captures individually. Hence, the two components are

<sup>5</sup>Burundi represents the variation in the UNPOs' typical approaches to peacebuilding, not peacekeeping (i.e., no robust enforcement missions, no concerted protection of civilians), as this is not the focus of this article.

<sup>6</sup>The UN and political elites advance redistributive reforms via a nationwide, elite-level peace process. Political inclusion and UNPO mandates are more likely to change annually than monthly.

the result of a difficult operationalization rather than two separate theoretical accounts of how peace operations can support inclusive peace.<sup>7</sup> Importantly, this measure also matches more closely the direct effect that the UN expects UNPOs to have (UNSG 2020).

Our dependent variable—*inclusive peace*—is a dummy variable that equals 1 if (a) there was no active conflict in the last 2 years *and* (b) political inclusion increased from the previous year. This means that our measure of success is short-term and incremental, and it can be reversed. In addition, countries may improve their political inclusion gradually and yet not qualify as a liberal democracy by other measures. These nuances in our measure of peacebuilding success are reflected in the case study, where we illustrate how initial progress toward the implementation of inclusive reforms may be halted, and even reversed, by a reluctant host government. To operationalize our dependent variable, we combine information on periods without active conflicts with V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2019) that measure exclusion of political groups.<sup>8</sup> We then standardize political exclusion and create a dummy that equals 1 when exclusion decreases over time (i.e., political inclusion improves). Finally, we combine the absence of violence and inclusiveness to create our measure of inclusive peace.

For our independent variables—which measure the degree of peacebuilding capacity in the UNPO relative to peacekeeping capacity—we use the PEMA data set (Di Salvatore et al. 2022).<sup>9</sup> We classify tasks as peacebuilding or peacekeeping based on the UN's own classification (UN Integrated Training Service 2017).<sup>10</sup> Tables 1 and 2 provide examples from mandates for peacekeeping and

<sup>7</sup>Our counterfactual is a UNPO without predominant peacebuilding capacity, not a country without UNPOs. In the supporting information (SI), Appendix E (p. 11) includes models that separately estimate the association between peacebuilding-focused UNPOs and violence (dummy for post-conflict and logged ACLED deaths) and peacebuilding-focused UNPOs and political inclusion; we find that mandates alone do not affect peace or exclusion separately. We also estimate models with UN troops as the independent variable and find results consistent with the literature showing that sizable troop presence reduces violence and lengthens peace. However, in line with our argument, we find troop presence to have no association with political inclusion.

<sup>8</sup>The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest level of exclusion defined as “when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces [...] based on their identity or belonging to a particular group” (Coppedge et al. 2019, 266).

<sup>9</sup>PEMA's coverage of peacekeeping missions only is not an issue, as SPMs are coded as fully peacebuilding focused in our data. We extend PEMA to non-African missions in our sample that are not coded in the currently available version.

<sup>10</sup>The same classification is used by Blair et al. (2021).

peacebuilding tasks.<sup>11</sup> By exploiting the richness of the PEMA data, we do not limit our peacebuilding measure to whether a UNPO has peacekeeping *and* peacebuilding tasks (i.e., multidimensionality); rather, we consider the prominence of peacebuilding tasks *relative to* peacekeeping tasks. Having four peacebuilding tasks and four security tasks could make a mission multidimensional, but not peacebuilding focused.

The first operationalization of our independent variable codes *peacebuilding operations* using a dummy that equals 1 for either SPMs (peacebuilding-focused by design) or for PKOs with a strong peacebuilding mandate (i.e., at least 60% of their total tasks are peacebuilding tasks in a given year). As a second operationalization, we measure peacebuilding mandates using the actual share of peacebuilding tasks included in them. SPMs are classified as peacebuilding-only missions, whereas we use the exact share of peacebuilding tasks (relative to peacekeeping tasks) for PKOs. Figure 6 shows variation in peacebuilding tasks across a sample of missions we analyze.

We focus on the collective effect of peacebuilding tasks, not the influence of specific tasks, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. We do not form theoretical expectations for specific tasks because UNPOs implement these tasks simultaneously and interdependently. It is not obvious which peacebuilding tasks are more important than others or how they should be weighted against each other. The peacebuilding effect of each task is context-specific (e.g., in some cases reforming the constitution is more important than reforming the security sector). Hence, our focus on the overall peacebuilding capacity of the mission does not make assumptions about what peacebuilding entails in different contexts. Furthermore, it is empirically difficult to isolate the effect of specific tasks that are part of a broader strategy on outcomes that are likely to be affected by their combined influence.

We include several covariates that have theoretical importance in our study. At the UNPO level, we include the number of previous UN missions (of any type) to each country in a given year and the (logged) size of military deployment (if any; IPI 2019). At the country level, we include a dummy for peace agreements (Pettersson, Högladh, and Öberg 2019) and the post-conflict years (based on the number of years without armed conflict). In addition to peace agreements, the specification includes the (logged) population, the (logged) amount of aid allocated to the host country (Tierney et al. 2011),

<sup>11</sup>This information is coded for each mission several times per year; we collapse it at the yearly level.

and a range of violent events (logged) from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (Raleigh et al. 2010). We also include the time lag of political exclusion.


We estimate a logit model given our dichotomous dependent variable, with mission-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. In order to compare peacebuilding success in countries that hosted peacebuilding-focused UNPOs (according to the two operationalizations of our independent variable above) and countries that hosted other types of UNPOs, we use CEM to reduce the imbalance among key covariates in the pre-deployment stage. In the analysis below, we match observations in the 3 years preceding a UN intervention based on their levels of political exclusion, armed violence, and number of troops in the first year of deployment (if any). Countries may also receive the treatment more than once (i.e., more than one peacebuilding mission authorized over time). We define treated units as those that have hosted at least one peacebuilding mission to ensure that the control group has never been in the treated group. After matching is performed, we have 275 observations left in our sample. In SI Appendix A.1 (p. 3), we further discuss other sources of endogeneity and provide additional evidence to corroborate the large-N analysis.

## Cross-National Results: Do UNPO Peacebuilding Mandates Foster Inclusive Peace?

Figure 4 reports the coefficients for peacebuilding missions (i.e., UNPOs with predominantly peacebuilding tasks) based on the estimates from the matched and unmatched samples (see full tables and CEM imbalance in SI Appendix B.1, p. 6, SI Appendix D, p. 10, and SI Appendix B.2, p. 7, respectively). The figure shows an overall positive association between inclusive peace and peacebuilding missions across the specifications. The estimates of the OLS before and after matching do not substantially differ, as could have been expected based on the small change in the multivariate distance post-matching. On average, UNPOs with strong peacebuilding mandates are expected to increase the chances of inclusive peace by approximately 20 percentage points.

We then use a continuous measure of the degree of peacebuilding focus of a UN mission based on the share of peacebuilding tasks in its mandate. Figure 5 shows the predicted probability of peacebuilding success—measured as inclusive peace—across all

**FIGURE 4 Relation between Peacebuilding Missions and Inclusive Peace**



Notes: The estimated coefficients of the association between peacebuilding missions and inclusive peace are based on results before matching (SI Appendix D, p. 10) and after matching (SI Appendix B.1, p. 6). 90% and 95% confidence intervals are shown.

levels of mandates' peacebuilding focus (0 to 1) before (bottom) and after (top) matching. The share of peacebuilding tasks within a UNPO is clearly associated with more inclusive peace when peacebuilding tasks make up at least 60% of the mission's overall tasks. The top panel, which depicts the predicted probabilities after CEM, shows that the probability of successful peacebuilding increases from approximately 4% to 30% when we compare missions with 60% and 75% proportions of peacebuilding tasks in their mandates, respectively. Furthermore, UNPOs whose peacebuilding tasks are less than approximately 60% of their total tasks are not associated with significant changes in the odds of inclusive peace.<sup>12</sup>

To address the relationship between UN missions and peace agreements, Figure 6 plots peace agreements (red circles) against peacebuilding mandates in some of the most prominent UNPOs, suggesting that UNPO peacebuilding can support peacemaking prior to a peace agreement *and* enable the implementation of the peace agreement. We corroborate this finding in the Burundi case study below, which describes how the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB), established in 1993, helped to foster consent among the divergent political parties for the 2000 Arusha agreement *and* supported the implementation of the agreement until the end of its mandate in 2004. SI Table A.1 (p. 3) also shows that peace agree-

<sup>12</sup>To corroborate these findings, we present robustness checks in the SI Appendix: A.1 selection issues (p. 2), A.2 before and after the PBF (p. 3), C alternative matching strategies (p. 8), D estimates before matching (p. 10).

ments do not affect the probability of the deployment of peacebuilding-focused UNPOs.



Overall, these findings imply that while a UNPO seems to require a minimal amount of peacebuilding tasks to affect inclusive peace, UNPOs with a smaller proportion of peacebuilding tasks (relative to peacekeeping tasks) may improve their prospects of supporting inclusive peace by adding more peacebuilding capacities. This does not mean that the Security Council should include as many peacebuilding tasks as possible; rather, UNPOs should be designed in ways that give priority to peacebuilding tasks *relative to* traditional peacekeeping tasks if they aim to support inclusive peace.

## Case Study: How UNPOs Address the Implementation Problem

Burundi's civil war began in 1993 after the murder of its first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, by members of the Burundian army. The conflict was rooted in the exclusion of Hutus from power while Tutsis (14% of the population) dominated all political, economic, and social institutions (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Uvin 1999). Nelson Mandela, the negotiator of Burundi's 2000 Arusha peace agreement, believed that ending Burundi's civil war required a fundamental redistribution of political, social, and economic resources to serve Hutus and Tutsis alike (ICG 2000). The Arusha agreement gave Burundi's 3-year transitional power-sharing government the responsibility for implementing these redistributive policies; it *did not* ensure that they had the political buy-in and financial resources necessary to do so (ICG 2000; Parties to the Arusha Agreement 2000).

Between 1993 and 2010, the UNSC mandated three sequential UNPOs to use their peacebuilding capacity to support peace negotiations and, subsequently, the implementation of the Arusha agreement. These UNPOs included the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB–, 1993–2004), a small SPM; the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB–, 2004–2006), a large peacekeeping mission with a high proportion of peacebuilding tasks; and the Integrated UN Office in Burundi (BINUB–, 2007–2010), a large SPM. Below, we describe how each of these three UNPOs used their predominant peacebuilding capacity to mobilize political support and fill capacity gaps necessary to advance Burundi's peace process, both before and after the Arusha agreement and with and without peacekeepers.

FIGURE 5 Predicted Probabilities of Inclusive Peace




Notes: The estimated coefficients of the association between peacebuilding missions and inclusive peace are based on results before matching (SI Appendix D, p. 10) and after matching (SI Appendix B.1, p. 6). Top panel is post-matching; bottom panel is pre-matching. 90% and 95% confidence intervals are shown.

## UNOB: Mobilizing Political Support and Capacity Pre- and Post-Agreement

The UN's peacebuilding efforts in Burundi began prior to the 2000 signature of the Arusha peace agreement.

In 1993, just after the outbreak of Burundi's war, the UNSC authorized UNOB, a political mission (SPM) with around a dozen civilian staff and no peacekeepers to support the negotiation of a peace agreement and, subsequently, its implementation (Annan 1999, 2000). UNOB's peacebuilding capacity consisted of

**FIGURE 6 Trends in Peacebuilding Tasks in a Sample of UNPOs**

Notes: Dashed lines report the yearly share of peacebuilding tasks in a mission's mandate based on PEMA (Di Salvatore et al. 2022). Red circles indicate a peace agreement was signed in the same year (Pettersson, Höglblad, and Öberg 2019).

four consecutive SRSGs and their political officers, who were mandated to engage in good offices (i.e., diplomatic discussions); institute confidence-building measures (i.e., engage in dialogue potentially related to the exchange of material rewards); and support for the restoration of constitutional rule (i.e., provide legal and political advice and facilitate political agreements) (Arnault 2006; Boutros-Ghali 1992). UNOB used this peacebuilding capacity to mobilize political support for the signature of the Arusha agreement in 2000 and provide supplementary capacity needed to facilitate its initial implementation (ICG 2001; UNSG 2001).

The Arusha agreement faced significant implementation problems related to the need for continued negotiations among its signatories and the insufficient capacity of the Burundian government to carry out the mandated redistributive reforms (Arnault 2006, 2). A core problem was that many of the thorniest issues in the peace talks—a cease-fire with the remaining rebel groups, distribution of military posts, and a new post-conflict constitution—were left unresolved in the final Arusha agreement (Wolpe 2011). To address these omissions, the Arusha agreement required the Burundian transitional government, which was created in 2001 and

composed of representatives of Arusha's signatory parties, to agree on solutions during the 3-year transitional phase (Parties to the Arusha Agreement 2000).

But the transitional government was made up of former parties to the conflict, many of whom were deeply mistrustful of one another and, thus, resistant to continued negotiations.<sup>13</sup> The implementation of Arusha's redistributive reforms also presented a big risk to members of the transitional government. The end of Burundi's 3-year transitional phase would lead to the likely election of a new government, leaving Arusha's signatories without the position in government for which they had long fought (Campbell and Uvin 2015, 288). Even if the members of the transitional government had been fully willing to negotiate and implement Arusha's redistributive reforms, they lacked the governance processes and financial resources necessary to do so (ICG 2003).

UNOB's peacebuilding capacity helped to address these implementation challenges, both before and after the signature of the Arusha peace agreement. Prior to the signature of the Arusha agreement, UNOB focused on bilateral negotiations with the parties to the conflict to

<sup>13</sup>Interview with staff B4, Bujumbura, February 24, 2009; staff B8, Bujumbura, March 6, 2009.

encourage them to join others at the negotiating table (Abdallah 2000; Arnault 2006). After the signature of Arusha in August 2000, UNOB supported continued negotiations among the members of the transitional government and between the government and the remaining rebel groups. These negotiations helped to support a peaceful transfer of power from Tutsi and Hutu leadership of the transitional government in April 2003, an unprecedented and unexpected occurrence in Burundi (ICG 2004). UNOB also worked with the South African mediation team to negotiate the Pretoria Protocol in November 2003, which brought Burundi's largest rebel group into the peace process (UNSG 2004a).

In addition, UNOB established the Secretariat for Arusha's Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) in 2003, filling crucial gaps in the transitional government's capacity to advance the peace process and continue to implement Arusha's redistributive reforms (UNSG 2004a).<sup>14</sup> Collectively, UNOB's peacebuilding capacities helped to create a more politically inclusive government and supported overall reductions in violence by facilitating cease-fire agreements with Burundi's rebel groups (ICG 2004).

The case of UNOB shows us that UNPO peacebuilding capacity, even before the signature of a comprehensive peace agreement and even in the absence of peacekeepers, can play a crucial role in advancing a country's peace process. In spite of UNOB's contribution, the UN Security Council determined in 2004 that further implementation of the Arusha agreement, including the successful completion of Burundi's 3-year transitional phase, required additional peacebuilding and peacekeeping capacity (ICG 2004).

### **ONUB: Sustaining Political Support and Capacity for Agreement Implementation**

In May 2004, the UNSC authorized the deployment of ONUB, the UN's first Chapter VII peacekeeping operation in Burundi, and mandated it with a large number of peacebuilding tasks and an important peacekeeping

<sup>14</sup>The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) also deployed peacekeepers to Burundi in April 2003 to secure combatant cantonment sites and provide additional support for the disarmament and demobilization of combatants (Boshoff and Vrey 2006; UNSG 2004a). This peacekeeping capacity, which arrived 10 years after UNOB's initial deployment and overlapped with UNOB for only a year, supported combatant demobilization but did not address the other political and capacity barriers to the implementation of the Arusha agreement.

force (UNSC 2004a).<sup>15</sup> At its peak strength in September 2005, ONUB had 855 civilian personnel, most of whom were focused on carrying out its peacebuilding tasks, and 5,665 military or police.<sup>16</sup> The UNSC mandated ONUB to help oversee the end of Burundi's transitional period, which was already delayed because of political deadlock within the transitional government around the electoral code and post-transition constitution and the reluctance of donors to provide the development funding necessary to support the implementation of Arusha's other reforms (ICG 2003; UNSG 2004b, 2005a). While ONUB's peacekeeping capacity focused on securing cantonment sites for demobilization and polling locations for elections, its significant peacebuilding capacity focused on mobilizing political support for these constitutional and electoral reforms and providing the capacity necessary to carry out the post-transition elections, security sector reform policies and training, and other redistributive reforms (UNSC 2004a).

According to an external review of ONUB, in "less than 18 months...ONUB played a key role in shepherding a disparate set of actors through the final hurdles of implementing a complex and multi-faceted political agreement;... it oversaw the drafting of a new and inclusive Constitution; it organised no fewer than six electoral processes that met with near universal acclaim; it took key steps towards providing Burundi with unified, coherent and multi-ethnic armed forces and police" (Jackson 2006, 27). For many Burundians, the creation of a new multiethnic armed forces—composed of former Burundian army and rebel groups—was a particularly important signal that Arusha's redistributive reforms were working, providing "a clear sign that the Arusha process had created a change" in Burundian politics.<sup>17</sup> This confidence was further strengthened with the success of the 2005 elections, which elected Pierre Nkurunziza—the former leader of Burundi's largest rebel group—as president. Together, these advancements in Burundi's peace process helped to institutionalize broader political inclusion and security throughout the territory (Uvin 2013).

The case of ONUB demonstrates that even when a UNPO has a robust peacekeeping capacity, its

<sup>15</sup>Ten of ONUB's 19 tasks were peacebuilding focused: human rights, police, and military reform (SSR); justice sector reform; refugee assistance; humanitarian coordination; electoral assistance; reestablishing state authority; demining; and border management.

<sup>16</sup>ONUB Facts and Figures, United Nations, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onub/facts.html> (accessed August 26, 2020).

<sup>17</sup>Interview with observer O11, Bujumbura, March 25, 2009.

predominant peacebuilding capacity also plays an important role in helping to address peace process implementation problems. While ONUB's peacekeeping capacities played a key role in providing security and logistical support for the demobilization of armed combatants and organization of elections, the majority of ONUB's support to the advancement in Burundi's peace process is directly attributable to its peacebuilding capacities (UNSG 2006b). Despite these important advances in Burundi's peace process, it was far from complete. ONUB, the transitional government, and their domestic and international partners had still not begun to implement many of Arusha's key judicial, socioeconomic, human rights, and security-related reforms—a task that the UNSC gave to ONUB's successor, BINUB (ICG 2005).

### **BINUB: Sustaining Host Government Consent and Addressing Capacity Gaps**

Soon after taking office, Burundi's newly elected democratic government requested that ONUB leave Burundi (Jackson 2006). President Nkurunziza argued that peace had already been established in Burundi and that the country did not need peacekeepers to keep it.<sup>18</sup> Given the numerous Arusha reforms that remained unimplemented, the UN Secretariat believed that Burundi still required the support of a UNPO to ensure that it did not return to war (Basagic 2008). After months of negotiation, the UN and the Burundian government agreed on a compromise: The UN would deploy a large SPM with significant peacebuilding capacity (Houngbo and Karenga 2006). ONUB ended its mandate on December 31, 2006, and BINUB's mandate began on January 1, 2007 (UNSC 2006). BINUB was charged with "providing continued peacebuilding assistance to the Burundian Government by strengthening national capacity to address the root causes of conflict" (UNSC 2006), supporting democratic governance, facilitating DDR [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] and continued security sector reform, and enabling human rights promotion and judicial reform (UNSC 2006, 2).<sup>19</sup> The UNSC had also mandated ONUB with these same tasks, but they remained uncompleted. Now BINUB was charged with implement-

ing them without the support of peacekeepers and with approximately 80 staff (UNSG 2006c, 4–5).

Like ONUB, BINUB was mandated to address the continuing political and capacity implementation problems facing Arusha's remaining reforms. BINUB received \$35 million from the UN Peacebuilding Fund to address these capacity barriers and implement the extensive peacebuilding tasks outlined in its mandate (Campbell, Kayobera, and Nkurunziza 2010; UNSC, 2006, 2007; UNSG 2006c). But there were also political barriers to implementing the remaining Arusha reforms. The ruling Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) party was increasingly resistant to international support, which it viewed as an external imposition. At the same time, the CNDD-FDD had begun to restrict civic space, including via targeted assassinations of civil society and political actors and the expulsion of opposition parties from parliament (HRW 2009; ICG 2008). Within this context of increased resistance to the implementation of Arusha's inclusive and redistributive reforms, BINUB engaged in regular negotiations with and facilitated dialogue among political parties and civil society actors that was not possible within the Burundian government (Campbell 2018, 163).

The head of BINUB, Youssef Mahmoud, believed strongly that the success of these peacebuilding efforts depended on BINUB's ability to engage in continuous dialogue with Burundi's political actors and, in particular, attain the Burundian government's buy-in. "To succeed, [peacebuilding] must be internally driven and owned, however weak, divided or unwilling the national partners may be. [In BINUB, a] conscious and consistent effort was made to shift at the outset the onus of sustaining peace to national stakeholders while ensuring continued engagement of regional and international actors in support of these stakeholders" (Mahmoud 2016, 138).

BINUB's focus on mobilizing political support for its peacebuilding activities worked better in some areas than others.<sup>20</sup> The Burundian government collaborated easily with its BINUB counterparts to strengthen and increase the cohesion and professionalization of the multiethnic National Defense Force (Campbell, Kayobera, and Nkurunziza 2010). But the government repeatedly sought to undermine BINUB's efforts at interparty political dialogue, even though they helped to unblock an interparty deadlock in parliament (Campbell et al., 2014). BINUB was operating within a context of increasingly deteriorating trust among Burundi's political parties and an

<sup>18</sup>Interview with UN staff member U01, Bujumbura, June 6, 2009.

<sup>19</sup>BINUB's peacebuilding tasks included human rights, state consolidation, democratic governance, rule of law, SSR, and donor/UN agencies coordination (UNSC 2006).

<sup>20</sup>Interview with UN staff member 1.7, Bujumbura, March 19, 2009.



increasing consolidation of power by the CNDD-FDD (Campbell, Kayobera, and Nkurunziza 2010; UNSG 2006a). In December 2009, the Burundian government asked the head of BINUB, Youssef Mahmoud, to leave the country. It claimed that Mahmoud's push for a truly independent electoral commission would bias the 2010 elections (HRW 2010). At the request of the Burundian government, BINUB closed at the end of 2010 (CIC 2010, 61).

The case of BINUB shows us that UNPOs with significant peacebuilding capacity, and without peacekeepers, can support increased political inclusion, but it requires continuously building momentum for these reforms among political elites. It also shows that if the host government withdraws its consent for these reforms, the UNPO is unlikely to be able to support their implementation (PBSO 2018). In addition, if the host government decides to engage in increasingly violent and oppressive behavior, the UNPO has few tools other than continuing to negotiate with political elites and attempting to fill gaps in the host government's conflict mitigation capacity (i.e., supporting governance, judicial, human rights, and security sector reforms; Campbell, 2014; Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011).

Host government consent is a key factor we could not account for in our statistical analysis, and one that the Burundi case shows has implications for UNPOs' contributions to inclusive peace. Host governments can withdraw their consent for the continued deployment of peacekeepers (DPKO 2008), for a UN peacebuilding task once mandated, or for a UNPO generally (Campbell and Matanock 2021). The Burundian government did all three, shaping the peacekeeping and peacebuilding behavior of the UNPOs deployed on its territory. Furthermore, this case shows that UNPO peacebuilding—as opposed to standard peacekeeping (i.e., patrolling, securing cantonment sites)—requires a higher degree of engagement with the host government and, consequently, carries a potentially greater risk that the lack of host government consent will undermine the UNPO's ability to implement its mandated peacebuilding tasks.

## Conclusion

While existing peacekeeping scholarship emphasizes how UNPO peacekeeping capacity mitigates the security dilemma (Fortna 2008), we contend that UNPOs' peacebuilding capacity also addresses the peace agreement implementation problem. We find that when a UNPO's peacebuilding capacity outweighs its peacekeeping capacity, it mobilizes political support for the peace agree-

ment's redistributive reforms and supplements the host government's capacity to implement these reforms. This mechanism contributes to inclusive peace, a measure of incremental peace process progress that is akin to the UN's aims in these contexts (UNSG 2015).

There are particular time periods and contexts in which UNPO peacebuilding capacity may be more effective. First, UNPOs may more easily support redistributive reforms in contexts where political parties have already signed a peace agreement committing them to implementing these reforms (Call and Campbell 2018). Second, it is unlikely that UNPO peacebuilders will be able to support the implementation of redistributive reforms without the host government's consent and cooperation.

There are also potentially important policy implications. Increased UN member state resources for peacebuilding may be delivering positive results, meriting continued investment. There are also important challenges: The absence of host government cooperation in the implementation of peacebuilding tasks greatly inhibits UNPO peacebuilding, regardless of available funding. This points to the need for further scholarship and policy frameworks on how UNPOs engagement with the host state and society shapes peacebuilding outcomes.

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## Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

**Appendix A:** Endogeneity Issues

**Appendix B:** Main Models - Full Tables

**Appendix C:** Alternative Matching - Full Tables

**Appendix D:** Models without Matching

**Appendix E:** Unpacking Inclusive Peace

**Appendix F:** Semi-structured Interview Sample, Methodology, and Protocol