Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries

MARGHERITA BELGIOIOSO
University of Kent

JESSICA DI SALVATORE
University of Warwick

AND

JONATHAN PINCKNEY
United States Institute of Peace

Do peacekeeping missions facilitate nonviolent political contention in post–civil war countries? The nonviolent expression of political grievances is a crucial part of the post–civil war peace-building process but is understudied thus far. We claim that the presence of peacekeepers significantly contributes to establishing a secure environment for nonviolent political contention, particularly nonviolent public protest. In addition, we claim that peacekeeping missions with personnel from countries with robust civil societies are more likely to promote nonviolent political contention because of prior socialization to civic engagement and bottom–top political participation. This is particularly true for UN police personnel (UNPOL), who both train local police forces and have the most direct interaction with protesters. We test our hypotheses using a newly crafted dataset on nonviolent protests in post–civil war countries and peacekeeping missions’ presence, size, and home–country composition. We find that peacekeeping missions’ presence significantly increases nonviolent protests in post–civil war countries. This effect is largely explained by the presence of UNPOL from countries with strong civil societies. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of post–civil war political revitalization and policy implications for the composition of peacekeeping missions.

Introduction
Do peacekeeping missions facilitate nonviolent political contention in post–civil war countries? Research on post–civil war recovery and institution building shows that peacekeeping missions frequently succeed in promoting such contention through top–down mechanisms such as peace settlements and power–sharing agreements (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Joshi 2013). However, scholars have devoted scarce attention to peacekeepers’ effects on politics from the bottom–up—encouraging ordinary citizens to shift away from political violence and embrace nonviolent mobilization and public engagement as primary tools for political contention. This understudied aspect of post–civil war political transitions is important because citizens’ nonviolent political engagement is more likely to reflect a genuine internalization of democratic norms and progress toward positive peace than top–bottom institutional changes (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 21). Institutional changes may be simply façade reforms that elites instrumentally enact to gain legitimacy and financial support from international donors. For example, Hyde (2011) shows that governments in post–civil war countries invite international election observers to signal an intention to democratize, even if they are not committed to democratization. This may explain why even after free and fair elections, progress on democratic transition in post–civil war countries is often reversed (Fortna 2008; Sambains 2008). In contrast, the population does not receive direct external material rewards from the international community. Thus, changes in their behavior toward nonviolent political contention more likely (though not conclusively) indicate a meaningful shift in a country’s long–term political environment.

In this article, we argue that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations positively influence this shift. We focus on nonviolent public protests as a key measure of grassroots civic engagement to explore this potential influence. We posit that peacekeeping missions provide two key resources that increase local capacity for mobilizing nonviolent protests: security and promotion of norms of nonviolent political participation. First, we argue that civilians in post–civil war societies need protection to participate in public life. Peacekeepers’ presence may both provide this basic protection and also disincentivize harsh repression from governments worried about international condemnation. In turn, these dynamics might facilitate bottom–up nonviolent political engagement. Yet, not all peacekeeping missions will have equal effectiveness in achieving this goal.
We posit that peacekeepers’ ability to encourage nonviolent protest also hinges upon their own socialization to norms valuing bottom-up civic activism. Peacekeepers from countries with robust civil societies and widespread nonviolent political engagement should facilitate an environment that encourages nonviolent protest more effectively than peacekeepers not socialized to this form of grassroots political participation. The internalization of democratic norms should be particularly important for UN police (UNPOL), who have the most direct day-to-day interaction with civilians, commonly monitor protests in host countries, and more importantly train the national police and co-deploy with them for crowd control.

We test our hypotheses on a sample of post–civil war countries after the end of the Cold War, using data on the presence, size, and makeup of peacekeeping missions. We proxy peacekeepers’ socialization to nonviolent civic engagement by levels of civil-society activism in their countries of origin and look at its effect on the number of nonviolent protests in post–civil war host countries. We use a very conservative measure of nonviolent protests, excluding any protests that escalated to riots. The rationale behind this choice is to consider the ability of the local populace to maintain nonviolent discipline as a proxy of the genuine acceptance of norms of political participation. We find that post–civil war societies hosting peace operations see an increase in nonviolent protests relative to countries without peacekeepers and that this relationship is largely accounted for by peacekeeping missions with a strong presence of peacekeepers from countries with higher levels of civil-society activism. The relationship is weaker for peacekeepers overall, but very strong for UNPOL in accordance with our hypotheses.

This study contributes to the post–civil war peacebuilding literature in two ways. First, in contrast to existing studies that focus on post–civil war democratization, we do not expect successful peace-building to result solely from top-down reforms (e.g., elections) imposed by an external actor (i.e., UN) or by domestic political elites under international pressure. Sustainable peace involves rebuilding societies not only via institutions that accommodate citizens’ concerns but also through “enabling citizens to articulate and act on their concerns within [those institutions]” (Wlodarczyk 2009, 212–13). Hence, we focus on the emergence of nonviolent protest as a fundamental pillar of positive peace at the microlevel, in line with studies analyzing missions’ impact on the behaviors and preferences of ordinary citizens (e.g., Blair 2019). To our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically investigates the effect that blue helmets’ presence and characteristics might have on ordinary citizens’ political mobilization. Second, by focusing on peacekeeper backgrounds, we develop a novel theoretical mechanism of the diffusion of democratic norms from peacekeepers to host countries’ population based on peacekeepers’ level of socialization to norms of nonviolent civic engagement. By doing so, we provide evidence that peacekeeping can also work through noncoercive means (Howard 2019).

In the remainder of the article we first situate our research in the recent literature on peace operations and post–civil war peace-building. We then present the theoretical rationale for our expectations: (1) peacekeepers can increase nonviolent protests by decreasing the security cost of mobilization, and (2) peacekeepers from countries with strong civil society will be particularly effective in encouraging nonviolent protests. We then present the research design we use to test our hypotheses. The results show a robust association between peacekeeping and post–civil war nonviolent protests. Our conclusion examines implications of our work for future research and peace-building policy.

### Post–Civil War Countries, Civil Society, and the Role of the International Community

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has authorized a growing number of peace-building operations. In contrast to traditional peacekeeping, in which lightly armed military units monitored compliance with previously agreed-upon ceasefires, peace-building missions have the long-term goal of creating an environment of positive peace (i.e., an environment in which civil war recurrence is not just unlikely but unimaginable) (Jarstad and Sisk 2008, 3). This shift has implied larger deployments of a variety of peacekeeping units, from traditional military peacekeepers to police to experts to help rebuild civilian state institutions.

There have been several major critiques of the effectiveness of specific peacekeeping missions (Autesserre 2009). Yet, the literature’s recurrent finding is that peacekeeping has been generally effective in preventing civil war reemergence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna, 2004, 2008; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017) and indeed that “the UN has actually become better at peacekeeping over time” (Sambanis 2008, 29). The positive effects of peacekeeping are even more pronounced given that peacekeeping missions tend to be sent to the most difficult cases (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Peace-building, while not without its challenges, has overall been an effective means of shifting societies away from large-scale violent conflict and toward positive peace.

To accomplish this, the UN typically encourages top-down changes. For example, free and fair elections have become a benchmark for peacekeeping missions’ goal to build democratic political institutions. However, peacekeeping missions’ mandates often also aspire to bring about bottom-up changes and task peacekeepers with rebuilding civil society. Typically, the Security Council requests peacekeepers to create secure environments conducive to wide participation and to “identify and support [existing] structures [that] will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 55). Besides providing safety for local stakeholders, missions’ mandates task peacekeepers with promoting national reconciliation and dialogue to encourage popular participation to the political process. The promotion of political participation by UN peace operations includes civic education campaigns, community meetings, media programming and leaflets. All these tools were successfully used in Cambodia (UNTAC) and contributed significantly to voters’ participation in elections (Vu 1995).

Research on peacekeeping and democratization has so far narrowly focused on top-down reforms. In general, the literature’s consensus on the macrolevel effect of peacekeeping on democratization has been positive (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). While there is some evidence that a too-rapid establishment of post–civil war democratic institutions can lead to civil war recurrence (Paris 2004), peacekeepers successfully promote democratic transitions and create political space where formerly violent armed actors compete nonviolently in the short term (Joshi 2013; Steinert and Grimm 2015). The common argument is that peacekeepers act as security guarantors for wartime rivals to disarm and enforce peace agreements. Existing studies focusing on institutional outcomes such as post–civil war elections or changes in regime have used macrolevel
indicators such as freedom scores as measures of democrati-
zation (Joshi 2013; Steinert and Grimm 2015). However,
democratic institutions in post–civil war countries are sus-
tainable only if parties are willing to cooperate in the long
term, especially after mission withdrawal (Joshi 2013). As
Auessere (2009) shows in her work on MONUC in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, a single-minded focus on
elections reduced UN peacekeepers’ ability to address prob-
lems of local violence. Too much of an emphasis on top-
down institutional changes such as elections can obscure the
need for deeper social transformation. In other words,
there is little hope for long-lasting democracy without the
democrats.

The emergence of such a society of democrats goes well
beyond the initial adoption of new institutions. For democ-

cracy to be long-lasting, there must not only be top-down shifts 
in the rules of political competition but also bottom-
up shifts in norms and preferences on how to push for po-
litical change when institutional politics fails to deliver. To
transition to sustainable, long-lasting peace, not only must elites shift from violent struggles for power, but ordinary cit-
izens must also shift from violent to nonviolent collective
mobilization, through avenues such as nonviolent protests
(Dudouet 2007). Nonviolent protests, short of any use of—
more or less spontaneous—violence are particularly impor-

tant because they provide a legitimate avenue for the ex-
pression of grievances that are not or cannot be address by
existing political institutions (Schock 2005; Chenoweth and
Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011). The post–civil war environ-
ment is rife with grievances for ordinary citizens that even
the most carefully designed political institutions will often fail to address. Thus, normalization of nonviolent methods
of responding to these failures is one of the most critical
transformations in shifting a society toward sustainable, pos-
tive peace.

For societies in post–civil war settings it is difficult to
achieve this bottom-up transformation independently for
two key reasons. First, the experience of violence during civil
wars normalizes its use to solve political problems, even for
individuals not directly involved in fighting (Collier 2003).

The experience of civil wars establishes the primacy of vio-

lence as a means of political change (Kalyvas 2006, 38). Just
as elites in a civil war environment rely on violence to resolve
d power struggles, so ordinary people often rely on violence
to resolve grievances. It follows that rebuilding social taboos
on the use of violence to solve conflict is a building-block of
sustainable peace (Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2011).

Second, a strong civil society plays a central role in orga-

nizing and promoting nonviolent activism (Putnam, Leonardi,
and Nanetti 1994; Tarrow 1998; Della Porta and Diani 2009).
Yet, civil wars tend to devastate a country’s civil-society in-
frastructure (Wood 2008; Kaplan 2017). Even after civil wars
end, government forces in the post–civil war environment
often target civil-society leaders because they see them as a
threat to their power and legitimacy (Colletta and Cullen
2000). Thus, armed conflict corrodes “the enabling environ-
ment for civil society” (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, 11) and
destroys the social capital for voluntary participation (Durán
2006; Dudouet 2007).

The literature has not examined whether peace mis-
cions can effectively encourage the bottom-up emergence
of democratic societies. We claim that peacekeeping
missions have a positive effect for nonviolent political
mobilization. Following Doyle and Sambanis (2000), we
argue that international resources can address local capacity
deficits brought about by civil war. In the following
section, we illustrate two mechanisms through which UN
peacekeeping operations can help revitalize nonviolent po-
litical engagement.

**Peacekeeping and Civil Societies—Enabling Mobilization and Diffusing New Norms**

We expect that UN peacekeeping missions positively affect
nonviolent political mobilization in two ways. First, we ex-
pect that the presence of peacekeeping missions encourages
feelings of physical security, and this, in turn, encourages
nonviolent protest by reducing perceived mobilization costs.
Second, peacekeepers that are socialized to the legitimacy of
nonviolent mobilization may diffuse norms of valuing and
protecting grassroots civic activism, thus encouraging non-
vviolent political mobilization. Therefore, we expect more
nonviolent protests in post–civil war countries depend-
ing on peacekeepers’ prior socialization to grassroots civic
activism.

The peacekeeping literature has long focused on peace-
keepers’ role as security guarantors for the leaders of for-
merly warring parties (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Joshi
2013). Yet, peacekeepers act as security guarantors not just
for political elites but also for the civilian population. UN
blue helmets can effectively reduce violence against civil-
ians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Bove and
Ruggeri 2016; Kathman and Wood 2016; Di Salvatore 2018),
thus creating a safer environment for nonviolent political
mobilization. Independently from whether the existence of
civil-society organizations precede the end of the large-

scale violent conflict, the capacity of these groups to mobi-

lize the population benefit from an environment in which
open dissent does not involve high risks of death or injury
(Paffenholz and Spurk 2006).

Since postwar states are often too weak to provide secu-


rity, peacekeeping missions play a critical role in creating
an enabling environment for civil society to thrive. Not only
does the presence of peacekeepers increase governments’
capability to secure the population from armed actors, it
also constrains governments’ use of indiscriminate violence
against protests. This is especially true in post–civil war
countries where incumbents are concerned about their in-

ternational reputation and seek external legitimacy. Hence,
peacekeepers not only protect civilians from nonstate actors’ violence but also from potential state repression.1

The Security Council often explicitly requests that mis-
cions support wide participation in political processes by
promoting a safe environment for civil society. Civil society
as a category includes organized and disorganized citizens
from human rights defenders to nonviolent demonstrators
(UN Security Council 2018). Typically, the UN Secretary


General’s reports on peacekeeping missions also condemn
governments for harsh repression and request authorities
to avoid excessive use of force in public demonstrations or
during civil unrest (see, for example, UN Office of the
Secretary-General 2012). Because of their mandate to
protect local populations, we expect that countries
hosting UN peace operations are more successful in de-
veloping nonviolent post–civil war political mobilization.
In addition, given that research on peacekeeping effec-
inlessness highlights unanimously that larger missions are
better at protecting civilians, we also expect that larger

---

1 Debate remains in the literature on peacekeeper effectiveness in constrain-


ving violence against civilians, with some finding that peacekeepers more effec-


tively restrain rebel violence (Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2017; Phayal and Prins


2019), while others find a violence-reducing effect conditional on power relation-


ships (Di Salvatore 2018).
deployments result in larger benefits for civic activism and mobilization. Small peace-building missions may have insufficient capacity to provide security beyond the immediate environs of their deployment areas and thus are unlikely to fill the security gap that would enable nonviolent participation.

**H1:** Post–civil war countries hosting UN peace missions have more nonviolent protests than post–civil war countries without UN missions.

**H2:** Post–civil war countries hosting more sizeable UN peace missions have more nonviolent protests.

### Peacekeeper Backgrounds and Diffusion of Norms of Nonviolent Contention

Reducing participation costs for citizens and increasing repression costs for governments are necessary conditions for nonviolent activism. However, the presence of peacekeepers may not be sufficient. Physical security is a material resource that UN missions can provide to citizens that consider nonviolent dissent a viable option. But UN missions can also provide "perceived resources" for nonviolent mobilization (Chenoweth and Uffelder 2017, 305–6) and encourage nonviolent protest by diffusing norms of nonviolent political contention. They can do so by promoting nonviolent civic engagement as a tactical innovation that is possible in post–civil war politics. Peacekeepers can act as teachers of norms (Finnemore 1993), for instance by promoting reliance on legal mechanisms of dispute resolution (Blair 2019). But how effectively can peacekeepers transmit these norms?

Several scholars have previously shown that characteristics of peacekeepers’ home countries are powerful predictors of their behavior when on mission. For example, Haass and Ansorg (2018) show that peacekeepers’ degree of civilian protection is in large part explained by their home country’s military spending, and Goldsmith (2009) and Lemay-Hébert (2009) show that variation in the effectiveness of UN police UNPOL closely follows differences in home-country quality of police training. Ruffa (2014, 290) documents “systematic variations in the way French, Ghanaian, Italian, and Korean units implement the mandate of the UN Mission in Lebanon in their daily military activity,” and sexual abuses are less likely to come from personnel from countries with higher gender equality and lower sexual violence (Karim and Beardsley 2016; Moncrief 2017). Similar to this earlier work, we argue that peacekeepers are better at transmitting democratic norms of nonviolent participation if they come from countries where nonviolent political engagement is the norm.

Peacekeepers who come from countries with robust civil societies are likely to have systematically different views on nonviolent protest from peacekeepers from countries without this feature. They may have been in civil-society organizations at home or participated in nonviolent protests. Even if they have not had these experiences first-hand, they are likely to have directly experienced positive political change because of nonviolent actions or civil-society activism more broadly. As a result, they are likely to accept that nonviolent protest is a healthy, normal aspect of political contention. This will give peacekeepers a greater intrinsic motivation to support nonviolent political engagement and not shirk in pursuing the UN’s goals of promoting this engagement as part of a broader agenda of democratization and positive peace.

Björkdahl’s (2006) study of UNPREDEP shows how the participation by peacekeepers from Nordic countries made civil war prevention particularly successful in Macedonia, due to their reputation as moral superpowers with the local populace. In contrast, peacekeepers from countries with little or no tradition of civic activism will have little capacity and motivation (and credibility) to exert themselves in protecting nonviolent protest or spreading UN norms of civic engagement. The UN is a credible norm entrepreneur but advancements in democracy and civic participation are conditional on missions’ capacity to be “convincing when promoting norms on the international arena” (Björkdahl 2006, 215). Thus, when peacekeepers themselves do not value nonviolent protest, even if bottom-up changes are part of a mission mandate, they will be unlikely to take place.

Furthermore, in many UN missions peace personnel act as an ancillary arm to the state’s repressive apparatus. The state typically perceives protest and other forms of extrastitutional political action as threatening (Davenport 1995). This dynamic is likely to be exacerbated in the uncertain environment of post–civil war peace-building. Civil-society groups often orchestrate highly disruptive resistance actions. Peacekeepers attempting to maintain stability may see protests as a threat that warrant repression if they do not come from countries where protest is perceived as a legitimate avenue of political expression. While we do believe that on average peacekeepers will be able to provide greater security for nonviolent protest, this security provision is likely to be stronger if the peacekeepers come from backgrounds that legitimate nonviolent political contention.

It is certainly possible that a peacekeeper’s country of origin plays no role in this respect. For example, Murdie and Davis (2010) find that levels of human rights protection in peacekeepers’ home countries do not predict improvements in human rights protections in mission’s host countries. The UN itself may be an environment in which mission personnel are effectively socialized to such norms and consequently well-equipped at promoting them in mission host countries. Yet, the literature on peacekeeping suggests that, despite the UN’s role as a norm socialization environment, significant differences based on national backgrounds remain (Cunliffe 2018).

While the security mechanisms apply across all types of UN personnel, we believe that the norm diffusion effect will be particularly pronounced among UNPOL. Police units were a marginal component of Cold War–era peacekeeping, but they have gained prominence as part of peace-building missions in the post–Cold War era (Grabosky 2009; Greener 2009). Only forty-four UN police officers were deployed in 1988, but that number grew to more than fifteen thousand in 2010 (International Peace Institute, n.d.). This increase does not just reflect an overall trend in increasing UN peacekeeping personnel. UNPOL grew dramatically as a proportion of peacekeeping personnel in the 1990s and have remained at an average of more than 12 percent of all UN peacekeepers since (See Figure 1).

UN police have a central role in encouraging nonviolent protests for two reasons. First, more so than military personnel, UNPOL come into extensive daily contact with citizens through their community policing responsibilities. These frequent interactions with and high visibility to citizens are more likely to increase citizens’ awareness of norms of nonviolent civic engagement. For example, in his study of rule of law in Liberia during UNMIL, Blair (2019) finds that day-to-day and face-to-face contact with UN police instills trust in institutions, especially when routine activities are conducted jointly with national police.
Second, and relatedly, UNPOL are in charge of training national police in nonviolent methods of crowd-control following principles of democratic policing (UN OHCHR 2004, 6). UNPOL also co-deploy with national counterparts to provide public order and manage civil unrest. This is the most direct avenue for the diffusion of norms and practices that protect nonviolent political mobilization. Training and joint operations with national counterparts allow UNPOL to be a channel for norm transmission even though the absolute numbers of UNPOL are a relatively small percentage of most peacekeeping deployments. Since it only takes a few UNPOL to train thousands of local police, UNPOL personnel have a “multiplier effect” that regular troops do not have.³ Third, since UNPOL personnel serve as domestic police in their home countries, their behavior reflects direct experience of their own country’s norms and best practices when it comes to responding to dissent. Thus, their attitudes are more likely than other UN peacekeepers to directly reflect their country’s norms on either fostering or suppressing nonviolent protests (Greener 2011). For example, special Portuguese UNPOL units were particularly effective in managing demonstrations in East Timor in 2006–7 because of their past experience in dealing with demonstrations at football matches in Portugal (Lemay-Hèbert 2009).

In contrast, most countries’ militaries play little role in the regulation of domestic dissent, thus their reflection of their country’s norms is likely to be less direct. Hence, when sent on UN missions, the political backgrounds of UNPOL are more relevant than for UN troops and more consequential in impacting nonviolent protest in host countries. UNPOL are more likely to have on-the-ground experience of nonviolent mobilization in their home countries. As Tanner and Dupont (2015, 664) write, “police work is shaped largely by knowledge and skills acquired specifically in the area where police officers have been socialized and where they learned the art of policing.” Police personnel with experience of nonviolent mobilization are more likely to have been socialized into its encouragement and, by implication, are more likely to bring norms for fostering nonviolent mobilization to missions’ host countries.

Our first two hypotheses assume that blue helmets are well equipped to advance the UN agenda regardless of their individual features. If all that is necessary for the revitalization of nonviolent political contention is the provision of security, then peacekeepers’ presence, and the size of their mission, should be sufficient to explain increased nonviolent protest. However, for the reasons stated above, we believe that the picture is more complex. Not all peacekeepers are interchangeable. We claim that peacekeepers’ prior beliefs and preferences—proxied by their nationality—will affect their capacity to promote nonviolent dissent. We also

---

²It is also important to note that UNPOL makes up to more than 30 percent of the total personnel in fifteen missions in our sample of twenty-one. This number changes over time within missions, but a nontrivial number of observations in our sample have significant UNPOL presence.
expect that the functions of UNPOL make it more likely for their backgrounds to be particularly relevant for the growth of nonviolent protest in countries hosting peace operations. Formally stated, we make the following hypotheses:

**H3a:** Peacekeeping missions with personnel from countries with strong civil societies are more successful at promoting nonviolent protests in host countries.

**H3b:** Peacekeeping missions with UNPOL from countries with strong civil societies are more successful at promoting nonviolent protests in host countries.

### Research Design

To test our hypotheses, we merge measures of home-country civil-society participation, nonviolent protest events, and peacekeeping operations in a dataset containing all post–civil war years from 1990 to 2011 in countries that experienced civil war termination in the post–Cold War era, as defined by the UCDP/GPIR Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson, Höglbladh, and Öberg 2019). Following Bara (2018), we code a conflict as terminated if there are at least two years of inactivity between conflict episodes in the same country. When a new conflict episode starts, the post–civil war phase ceases. A country enters the sample again when there is a new conflict termination followed by two years of inactivity. We limit our analysis to countries that experienced civil war termination in the post–Cold War era for two reasons. First, after the end of the Cold War multidimensional peacekeeping missions became an essential part of UN policy through the “Agenda for Peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Second, during this period UN peacekeeping missions underwent major reforms and expansion of mandated tasks, including more direct interventions in policing and democratization. Our final dataset includes seventy countries, with 1,078 country-year observations, with and without peacekeeping missions.

### Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is the number of nonviolent protests in a given post–civil war country-year. We extract this measure from the Phoenix Historical Event Database (PHE) (Althaus et al. 2019). PHE is an event dataset collecting information on political events in every country in the world from three major news repositories: the *New York Times*, the BBC’s summary of world broadcasts (SWB), and CIA’s foreign broadcast information service (FBIS). Events data are automatically coded from reports in these news sources using the PETRARCH events data coding pipeline. PETRARCH creates events following the CAMEO events ontology, with the basic structure of an actor performing an action on a target (Schrodt et al. 2005). The coding algorithm categorizes every action based on a predefined set of verbs such as “protest,” “attack,” or “criticize.” We selected all events with the verb code 14 (“protest”) and then aggregate the number of events with this verb code to the country-year. We limit our dependent variable to nonviolent protests to capture a shift toward more nonviolent political engagement, excluding the code for riots and other spontaneous violence.

In the vast majority of post–civil war countries-years (almost 80 percent) we do not observe any nonviolent protests. Roughly 9 percent of the observations report a single nonviolent protest, and 4 percent of the observations report two nonviolent protests. This is in line with Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter (2019), who find that demonstrations and strikes are relatively rare during civil wars and indicates that post–civil war countries with sustained nonviolent protests also are relatively rare. This finding speaks also to the challenging nature of encouraging nonviolent political contention in a post–civil war environment.

### Independent Variables

We have four independent variables, corresponding to our four hypotheses. First, we code a dummy variable for post–civil war countries that host peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in a given year to test Hypothesis 1. Second, we use the logged number of peacekeepers deployed in a country to test Hypothesis 2. Both variables are from the International Peace Institute’s database on peacekeeping missions (International Peace Institute, n.d.).

In addition to these two commonly used variables, we add two variables that capture the composition and background of peacekeepers in general and then peacekeeping police forces in particular—our most novel empirical contribution. To construct these variables, we use the civil-society participatory environment index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (*cs_part*). This variable measures the degree of civil-society activity in a country in a particular year by combining several measures of civic engagement (Coppedge et al. 2017, 45). The variable is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1.

Peacekeeping scholars and experts are well-aware that most contributions to UN personnel do not come from Western democracies, in part because of the so-called body bag syndrome (Raes, Bois, and Buts 2019). Hence, one might expect that an index on peacekeepers’ background measuring robustness of their country’s civil society would be, on average, quite low. In fact, there is significant variation in UN peacekeeping contributing countries’ performance on this score. Figure 2 below plots the scores of the current top five contributing countries to UN peacekeeping over our period of study. Four out of the five score at least

---

3. See Appendix Table A7 for a complete list of post–civil war periods included in our sample.

4. Both the SWB and FBIS are services in which the respective organizations transcribe and translate to English reports from local media sources. This provides a crucial advantage over alternative sources to capture events such as newswires, which rely on reports from the staff of a single organization. The FBIS monitors more than thirty thousand local sources, while the SWB monitors more than three thousand local sources (Leetaru 2010). While the patterns of data collection in these sources do exhibit some bias toward “strategically important” countries, they provide more comprehensive coverage and ameliorate the reporting bias inherent in cross-national event data collection, a particular problem for studies of nonviolent action (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015).

5. For previous studies with a similar strategy, see Chiba and Gleditsch (2017) or Murdie and Peksen (2015).

6. Several other datasets contain information on nonviolent protests. We selected the PHE because of its global scope and temporal range. We considered several alternatives, including NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2015), which is too highly aggregated, and the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012), NAVCO 3.0 Dataset (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018), and Mass Mobilization in Authoritarian Countries Dataset (Weidmann and Röd 2019), none of which have the necessary temporal and geographic scope. We also considered the widely used Banks Cross-National Time Series (Banks and Wilson 2017), which has the necessary scope, but up until 2011 is based entirely on the *New York Times* and thus is likely to omit smaller protests or protests in less high-profile conflicts. As a robustness check, we perform a replication of our primary results using the ICEWS dataset (Boscoe et al. 2015), which has close to the necessary scope but only begins its coverage in the late 1990s.

7. In contrast, only 39 percent of OECD country-years experience no nonviolent protests during the same period. Twenty-six percent of OECD country-years experience more than two nonviolent protests.
MARGHERITA BELGIOIOSO, JESSICA DI SALVATORE, AND JONATHAN PINCKNEY

Figure 2. Civil-society scores from top peacekeeping countries above a 0.7. Ethiopia is the exception, with a score consistently below 0.4.

For our independent variable measuring peacekeepers’ background, we collect the civil-society score for every country contributing peacekeepers to a peacekeeping mission. For each peacekeeping mission-year we then sum the scores for each contributing country, with each score weighted by the proportion of total mission personnel from that country. We create a similar variable only looking at proportion of UN police from that country. This is equivalent to the following formula for each mission.

\[ PK_{CS\_PART} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi_{jt} \times CS_{PART_{jt}} \]

In this formula the peacekeeping mission consists of contributing countries \(1 \ldots n\), \(\pi_{jt}\) is the share of peacekeepers (any or UNPOL only) in a mission from each contributor country \(j\) at time \(t\), and \(CS_{PART_{jt}}\) is the civil-society participatory environment score for country \(j\) at time \(t\). The basic intuition behind this index is similar to a spatial lag. Instead of defining distance between two countries geographically, we define distance depending on how many nationals a contributing country sends to the host country.

To clarify how the peacekeepers’ background index works, suppose a peacekeeping mission is made up of personnel from two countries: country A and country B. A and B send ninety and ten troops to a mission respectively, for a total mission complement of one hundred peacekeepers. If country A scores 0.5 on the civil-society index and country B scores 0.75 in a given year, the index for that mission in that year will be calculated as follows:

\[ PK_{CS\_PART} = \left[ \left( \frac{90}{100} \times 0.5 \right) + \left( \frac{10}{100} \times 0.75 \right) \right] = 0.525 \]

We use the version of this measure calculated across the entire peacekeeping population to test Hypotheses 3a on the impact of all peacekeepers on nonviolent protest incidence. We use the version calculated only on the national origins of UN police personnel to test Hypothesis 3b. Figure 3 displays the variation in the version of this score measured across all peacekeeping personnel in all country-years with peacekeeping missions.

**Control Variables**

There are many factors that may influence both the deployment and character of UN peacekeeping missions and the number of nonviolent protests in a country-year. Thus, we include several potential confounders in our main statistical models. In all our models we control for time-invariant country characteristics through country fixed effects, for the level of the dependent variable at \(t-1\), and for several additional time-varying covariates.

First, we control for the number of years from the end of the civil war. The variable “years of peace” counts the number of years since the beginning of the post–civil war phase. We expect that the more the years after the end of a large-scale violent conflict, the more likely the society of that given country is to adopt nonviolent means of political contention and the less likely peacekeeper presence is.

Second, we control for total population (logged) as a proxy for country size. Larger countries are likely to see more dissent in general and thus have a higher baseline level of nonviolent protest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Larger countries are also more likely to experience civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and therefore motivate the UN to deploy PK missions. We extract our measure of population from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank n.d.).

Third, we control for logged GDP per capita (World Bank). Higher GDP per capita is generally correlated with democracy (Przeworski 2000), as well as with nonviolent protest (White et al. 2015). We therefore expect that countries with higher GDP per capita experience more nonviolent protests. Poorer countries are more likely to experience severe period of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoefller 2004) and therefore motivate the UN to deploy missions.
Fourth, we control for a country’s interconnectivity with global and international civil society. We measure this using the INGO Network Country Score (INCS) from Paxton et al. (2015). We expect countries’ higher connectedness to international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to increase both nonviolent protests and peacekeeping mission deployment (Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Cunningham, Dahl, and Fruge 2017). One of the criteria the UN Security Council takes into account when deciding to deploy a peacekeeping mission is the existence of regional or subregional organizations and their ability to assist in resolving the situation (United Nations 2008, 47).

Fifth, we include Political Terror Scale (PTS) in our specification to account for the cost of mobilization. The presence and composition of UN peacekeeping troops might affect governments’ reactions to contentious political behavior and, by implication, the willingness and capability of citizens to engage in exclusively nonviolent protest. The PTS is a measure of states’ violations of citizens’ physical integrity rights (Gibney et al. 2019).

Sixth, we control for levels of ongoing political violence, which may suppress nonviolent mobilization. UCDP does not code violence after conflict is terminated, hence we use the number of violent events from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). Although we focus on post–civil war cases, we want to control for instances of political violence that emerge in this context, especially because of the first hypothesis we formulate regarding the need for a secure environment for mobilization.

Finally, we include a control for any national elections as these are common cause of nonviolent protests (Tucker 2007; Brancati 2016). To construct this variable, we collapse the “election type” variables from V-Dem into a single binary indicator (Coppedge et al. 2017, 84). Table 1 below contains descriptive statistics for each of the variables we use in our analysis.

### Quantitative Analysis

We estimate negative binomial models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country on the number of nonviolent protests occurring in post–civil war countries each year. For comparison, Tables 2 and 3 also report models without country fixed effects. We run all models in the full population of post–civil war country years, as well as running models testing our hypotheses on peacekeepers’ background within the population of country-years with peacekeeping years alone, to ensure that our findings are not driven by the comparison between country-years with and without peacekeeping missions.

Models 1 and 2 (Table 2) show that the mere presence of PKOs is associated with more frequent nonviolent protests, while increasing the size of the mission has no correlation with increased nonviolent protest. Thus, while we find support for Hypothesis 1, the fact that mission size does not explain variation in nonviolent civic engagement suggests that peace missions’ security effect may be symbolic: knowing of, or seeing peacekeepers in the streets, regardless of the number, enhances citizens’ perceptions of physical safety both from nonstate armed actors and state repression, thus decreasing mobilization costs in unstable post–civil war settings.

In Table 3, we test our two hypotheses on the effects of peacekeepers’ civil-society backgrounds. We find some support for the hypothesis that missions with peacekeepers...
Table 2. Security-effect of PK missions (H1 and H2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bivariate; PK Dummy</td>
<td>Full model; PK Dummy</td>
<td>Bivariate; PKO size (log)</td>
<td>Full model; PKO size (log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO dummy</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.453*</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO size (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>0.040**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV t-1</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of peace</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>2.569**</td>
<td>2.549**</td>
<td>2.569**</td>
<td>2.549**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.827)</td>
<td>(0.842)</td>
<td>(0.827)</td>
<td>(0.842)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCS</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.962)</td>
<td>(0.938)</td>
<td>(0.962)</td>
<td>(0.938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election year</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.151*</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.151*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
<td>0.503***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Events t–1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.584***</td>
<td>−44.764***</td>
<td>0.605***</td>
<td>−44.238***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(13.174)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(13.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnalpha</td>
<td>0.906***</td>
<td>−0.886***</td>
<td>0.913***</td>
<td>−0.874***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>3842.093</td>
<td>2874.794</td>
<td>3846.367</td>
<td>2773.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3857.041</td>
<td>3268.290</td>
<td>3861.315</td>
<td>2911.483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Standard errors clustered by country. (2) Statistical significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001.

From countries with robust civil societies may foster more nonviolent protests in host countries (Model 5 and 6), although this relationship is not significant within the subsample of countries hosting peacekeeping missions (Model 7). The background of all peacekeepers matters when comparing cases with and without missions, but within missions does not have a significant effect on nonviolent protests. In contrast, the impact of police background is positive and robustly significant both when running the analysis across countries with and without missions (Models 8 and 9) and when subsetting the analysis to countries with missions (i.e., accounting for variation of police background and nonviolent protests exclusively) (Model 10). This confirms our hypothesis that socialization to nonviolent protests among UN police is particularly important for fostering nonviolent protests in host countries.

Regarding the control variables, Table 2 and Table 3 show that larger countries with a larger population also experience higher levels of nonviolent protest. Election years are also associated with more nonviolent protests. More state repression (PTS) is associated with more rather than less nonviolent protests, which is not surprising considering the feedback effect in the relationship between dissent and repression (Carey 2006). What are the substantive effects of the relationship between peacekeeper civil-society socialization and host-country nonviolent protest? Figures 4 and 5 below show the predicted probability of the occurrence of a minimum number of nonviolent protests (specified on the x-axis), given different levels of the main independent variable (peacekeepers’ background). In both figures all the control variables are held at their means, while the election year variable is set at 0 and the peace years variable is set at 1. In other words, this is the predicted probability of the occurrence of a minimum number of nonviolent protests or more in a nonelection year immediately following the end of a civil war.\(^\text{10}\)

As Figure 4 shows, the presence of any peacekeeping operations increases the probability that there will be at least one nonviolent protest from roughly 27 percent to roughly 40 percent. Country-years with peacekeeping missions have a probability of experiencing at least two nonviolent protests of roughly 13 percent and a probability of experiencing at least three nonviolent protests of around 6 percent.

What about the differences within peacekeeping missions for UNPOL? Figure 5 analyzes the difference in predicted number of protests given three different levels of UNPOL civil-society socialization. We select three significant contributors to UN peacekeeping that have widely different civil-society scores: Ethiopia, the current largest police contributor to UN peacekeeping, which has a civil-society score of roughly 0.24; Rwanda, the second largest contributor, which has a score of roughly 0.79; and the United Kingdom, the largest contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which has a score of 0.96.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\)Predicted probabilities generated by calculating predicted values from Model 2 for Figure 4 and Model 9 for Figure 5 and then calculating the probability density function for the discrete values of the dependent variable specified on the x-axis.

\(^{11}\)These numbers are their 2017 scores as per V-Dem.
Table 3. Diffusion of norms and peacekeepers’ background (H3a and H3b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PK civil-society score</td>
<td>Bivariate; All PK</td>
<td>0.554***</td>
<td>1.427***</td>
<td>1.269***</td>
<td>0.440***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(0.466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO size (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>−0.008</td>
<td>−0.082</td>
<td>−0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV t−1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of peace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.745***</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>2.716**</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.825)</td>
<td>(2.454)</td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td>(2.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>0.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.956)</td>
<td>(3.323)</td>
<td>(0.898)</td>
<td>(2.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.167*</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.506***</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.537***</td>
<td>0.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.361)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent events t−1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.585***</td>
<td>−47.569***</td>
<td>−8.058</td>
<td>0.627***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(13.077)</td>
<td>(35.288)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inalpha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.906***</td>
<td>−0.887***</td>
<td>−0.759**</td>
<td>0.915***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td></td>
<td>3842.152</td>
<td>2749.461</td>
<td>522.071</td>
<td>3848.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td></td>
<td>3857.101</td>
<td>2842.916</td>
<td>561.885</td>
<td>3863.037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Standard errors clustered by country. (2) Statistical significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Figure 4. Minimum protest probability across PKO and non-PKO years

A peacekeeping mission dominated by police personnel with the lowest of these three scores has a probability of experiencing at least one nonviolent protest of around 30 percent. This probability increases sharply in missions dominated by personnel from the countries with higher scores. For missions with personnel with civil-society scores similar to the United Kingdom, the probability of experiencing at least one nonviolent protest is more than 60 percent.

Robustness Checks

The supplementary material includes a battery of robustness checks to ensure that our results are not a statistical artifact of our modeling choice. The main findings do not change when using a simple panel OLS regression (Section A1), adding two-way fixed effects (A2), using an alternative subsample limited to five years since the civil war ended (A3), using an alternative variable from V-Dem to measure...
peacekeepers’ civil-society socialization (A4), using an alternative nonviolent protest count from the ICEWS dataset (A5) and replicating models from Table 3 using a Poisson estimator with two-way fixed effects (A8).

**Addressing Selection Bias**

Our quantitative testing thus provides strong evidence that both peacekeeper deployment and the origin countries of UNPOL personnel have a strong positive association with nonviolent protests in host countries. In this section, we discuss several types of selection biases and attempt to alleviate endogeneity concerns that must be addressed in order for our argument to be causally plausible. We consider three potential selection issues: First, UN peacekeeping missions generally may be sent to “easy” cases where nonviolent protest is more likely. Second, contrary to UN troops, UNPOL may only be sent to places where the security situation has already improved. Third, countries with high civil-society scores may decide to contribute to missions in countries where the security situation is better and nonviolent protest is more likely.

The first potential selection bias has been extensively addressed in the literature on peacekeeping effectiveness, with the work of Fortna (2004, 2008) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003) suggesting that peacekeeping missions tend to be sent to the “most difficult” cases, namely where violence is more severe. In the supplementary materials (Table A6.1), we do find that missions are more likely to go where violence endures even in the post–civil war period. The second and third selection bias issues have not been explicitly examined. Hence, we perform additional statistical test to ensure that these possible selection biases are not driving our results.

In Tables A6.1 and A6.2 (supplementary materials), we use seemingly unrelated regression estimation to model the number of protests conditional on the decision to deploy. These models are commonly used to alleviate omitted variable bias related to unobservables. Notably, our results do not change significantly when we use these models to estimate the impact of peace missions on nonviolent protests. But more importantly, these models shed light on the severity of the selection biases mentioned. First, we find that the decision to deploy both troops and police are explained by the same variables: namely, when violence is high (Models A6.3a and A6.4b in Table A6.1). Hence, it does not seem to be the case that UNPOL are sent to easier cases compared to troops, which reduces our concern over the second potential source of selection bias.

Finally, we investigate whether OECD countries, which both have the highest civil-society scores and may have outsized influence on where their peacekeepers are sent, only deploy them to countries where nonviolent protest is likely. We look at this in two ways: the level of violence in the host country and the underlying strength of the host country’s civil society, Figure A1 in the supplementary materials plots the correlation between the share of personnel from OECD countries and the average levels of conflict and violence against peacekeepers in receiving countries. We also plot the share of contribution against the civil-society score of receiving countries. We find that OECD countries are somewhat less likely to deploy to violent cases, but they are not more likely to deploy to countries with strong civil societies. Thus, the third selection bias concern does not hold empirically since there is virtually no correlation between civil-society scores in receiving countries with both the percentages of peacekeeping police and troops from OECD countries.

These tests strongly suggest that our results are not being driven by any of several different types of selection bias. Peacekeepers are not sent to “easy” cases, nor do UN police or personnel from influential countries with strong civil-society scores selectively choose to go to countries where nonviolent protest is particularly likely. The selection process for assigning UN peacekeeping missions and their personnel does not appear to directly influence the relationship we are testing, strengthening our confidence in its causal weight.

**Qualitative Evidence of the Security and Norm Transmission Mechanisms**

To further corroborate our argument, we present some brief qualitative examples detailing our mechanisms at work, following the logic of Lieberman’s (2005) “nested analysis.” While space does not permit a full qualitative examination of these issues (an endeavor we leave for future research),
Several cases illustrate how peacekeeping missions’ presence can create the secure environment necessary for citizens’ participation in nonviolent protest. During the UN mission in Namibia (UNTAG), interviews among the population revealed how many recognized the violence-reducing impact of the mission. Hearn (1999) mentions respondents describing UNTAG surrounding and protecting people during public meetings. Another interviewee recalled that UNTAG used to patrol and show impartiality in crowd control: UNTAG was “moving around when people were marching or protesting . . . [T]he UN would protect say the SWAPO supporters from the DTA or the DTA supporters from SWAPO” (Hearn 1999, 157). MINUSTAH’s peacekeepers similarly used to escort peaceful demonstrators. When the national police (HNP) used excessive violence against peaceful demonstrators, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Special Representative successfully conveyed the message that civilians’ safety was a priority more than the mission’s support to the police and was willing to order troops to fire on HNP if necessary (Moreno, Braga, and Gomes 2014). UN peacekeepers have also been playing an important role in preventing escalation of violence during protests. UNMIL in Liberia has monitored peaceful demonstrations during the 2009 elections, while also breaking up protests as they were turning violent (Voice of America 2009). In some cases, UNPOL repelled violent action by national police to protect protesters (Al-Jazeera 2011).

While the examples above clearly depict how peacekeepers reduce the cost of mobilization by protecting and monitoring peaceful assemblies, we face (as others, see Checkel 2017) challenges tracing the process of norm socialization. It is not possible to directly observe norm transmission and internalization, especially because individuals may sometimes be unaware of such processes. Nonetheless, here we provide some evidence in support of the proposed norms transmission mechanism.

First, we know that blue helmets—and UNPOL in particular—regularly interact with civilians and national counterparts to promote norms of reconciliation and nonviolence. The UN publishes information on national police being trained by UN staff on crowd control and democratic policing, particularly in preparation for politically relevant events such as elections. Top-level officers also believe that “peacekeeping is about teaching a population to change its behavior” (Howard 2019, 176). The existence of such routines and belief within missions represent a hoop test for our argument as it is necessary—but not sufficient—to support our hypothesis (Van Evera 1997). We also identified smoking-gun evidence that illustrate how peacekeepers can act as agents of norm diffusion. Focusing on the case of Namibia, Howard (2019) refers to UNTAG as an example of how peacekeeping has relied on education and training as noncoercive tools that “persuade the peacekeepers to behave differently.” Her case study illustrates the UNTAG effort to recreate a model of a police force along the lines of British “policing by consent” and concludes that the mission succeeded at promoting those specific norms through training. As she concludes, “UNTAG had essentially changed the society’s relation to the police” in just two years (Howard 2019, 73). This is strong evidence that norm diffusion through peacekeepers can be a powerful mechanism of change.

Interestingly, her argument does not refer to features of the mission, such as its composition. Our argument that some peacekeepers are better equipped at transmitting nonviolent norms than others, however, nicely fits the UNTAG case. UNTAG featured a surprisingly high level of participation from Western democracies, with nine highly developed Western democracies contributing to the 1,500-officer strong police force sent to Namibia. Consistent with her argument, our theory would also expect that the coherence and alignment between UN norms, objective, and peacekeeper background explain the success of UNTAG in building a police force that values civic engagement and refrains from abuses.

Interactions with peacekeepers via education and training also changed citizens’ beliefs about their rights during UNTAG in Cambodia. The mission was deployed with the key task of organizing elections and ensuring citizens’ participation. UNTAC made extensive use of education and information tools to convince political actors and the local population about the importance of elections and voting in democratic systems. UNTAC made extensive use of education and information tools to convince political actors and the local population about the importance of elections and voting in democratic systems. UNTAC made extensive use of education and information tools to convince political actors and the local population about the importance of elections and voting in democratic systems. UNTAC made extensive use of education and information tools to convince political actors and the local population about the importance of elections and voting in democratic systems. UNTAC made extensive use of education and information tools to convince political actors and the local population about the importance of elections and voting in democratic systems. UNTAC made extensive use of education and information tools to convince political actors and the local population about the importance of elections and voting in democratic systems.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping missions’ success goes well beyond separating combatants. Post–civil war positive peace requires creating conditions for grievances to be resolved through nonviolent, rather than violent means. In this context, peacekeepers may play an important role in providing two fundamental resources: a safe environment and the awareness that citizens can and should exercise their right to engage in nonviolent protest. Enhanced public security from large-scale violent conflict and state repression, coupled with promotion of norms of nonviolence, are resources that peacekeepers can provide to enable local capacity for building sustainable peace. Perceptions of safety can enable nonviolent mobilization where nonviolence is an option that citizens might need to select to push for political change. Diffusion of norms of nonviolence may foster a shift to positive peace by introducing new forms of political participation that were not available before the mission’s arrival.

We find that indeed post–civil war countries with peacekeeping missions see more nonviolent protest than countries without peacekeeping. This effect is further encouraged by peacekeeping police personnel from countries with robust civil societies where nonviolent political protest is a normal avenue of political contention. The highly aggregated nature of our data means that we are unable to test our proposed mechanisms of increased security and norm diffusion directly, but the strong and robust correlation between the measure of police personnel background and increased nonviolent protest, as well as indicative qualitative evidence from several peacekeeping missions, suggests that more than simple security provision is in play. The character of the peacekeepers themselves appears to impact the expression of peaceful dissent.

These results indicate that peacekeeping missions may positively affect the growth of nonviolent political engage-

---

12 Some examples of specific crowd-control and democratic police training in UNMIL (UN News 2017a; UN News 2014), UNFIL (UN News 2017b), and UNMIS (UN News 2010).

13 Specifically Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, and Sweden.
ment. However, the findings also show that not all peacekeepers have been equally effective in promoting this growth. This is troubling in the current UN peacekeeping environment, in which wealthy democratic countries with more robust civil societies are shifting the burden of UN peace operations to less-developed countries with weaker civil societies.

Our findings have noteworthy policy implications for peacekeeping missions’ design. While the bulk of funding for UN peace operations still comes from highly developed nations, this research suggests that encouraging avenues of nonviolent political engagement such as nonviolent protest needs something more. Whether peacekeepers can be effective avenues for diffusing democratic norms of nonviolent political engagement may depend on whether they have been thoroughly socialized to these norms. Thus, policymakers should carefully consider focusing on getting personnel from countries with stronger civil-society protections, particularly for personnel covering police functions.

Our findings open many new avenues for research. In particular, while we have presented some indicative examples of our mechanisms of security provision and norm diffusion at work, both mechanisms require in-depth qualitative testing. We have also assumed that national-level differences translate to meaningful differences across populations of peacekeepers. This assumption would be stronger with more direct information on attitudes toward nonviolent protest among peacekeepers. Further empirical research is also needed to disentangle the effect of UN training from the effect of peacekeepers national and cultural backgrounds.

Finally, this research contributes to the growing literature focusing on the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Yet, it suggests that future research requires some important caveats. Just as success in preventing civil war recurrence and promoting top-down democratization depends on mission size and other factors, promoting bottom-up transformation of society may require peacekeepers who can act as effective agents of positive change.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

References


